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COURT (CHAMBER)
CASE OF HORNSBY v. GREECE
(Application no. 18357/91)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 March 1997
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
1
In the case of Hornsby v. Greece
1
,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions
of Rules of Court A
2
, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr R. BERNHARDT, President,
Mr F. GÖLCÜKLÜ,
Mr L.-E. PETTITI,
Mr A. SPIELMANN,
Mr N. VALTICOS,
Mr J.M. MORENILLA,
Sir John FREELAND,
Mr L. WILDHABER,
Mr D. GOTCHEV,
and also of Mr H. PETZOLD, Registrar, and Mr P.J. MAHONEY, Deputy
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 September 1996 and on 27 January
and 25 February 1997,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of
Human Rights ("the Commission") on 11 December 1995, within the three-
month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the
Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated in an application (no. 18357/91)
against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Commission under Article 25
(art. 25) by two British nationals, Mr David Hornsby and Mrs Ada Ann
Hornsby, on 7 January 1990. The applicants, who were designated by their
initials during the proceedings before the Commission, subsequently
consented to the disclosure of their identity.
The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48)
and to the declaration whereby Greece recognised the compulsory
1
The case is numbered 107/1995/613/701. The first number is the case's position on the list
of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers
indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on
the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
2
Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol
No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by
that Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as
amended several times subsequently.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
2
jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was
to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by
the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d)
of Rules of Court A, the applicants stated that they did not wish to take part
in the proceedings. The British Government, who had been notified by the
Registrar of their right to intervene (Article 48 (b) of the Convention and
Rule 33 para. 3 (b)) (art. 48-b), did not indicate any intention of so doing.
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr N. Valticos,
the elected judge of Greek nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43),
and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)).
On 29 September 1995, in the presence of the Registrar, the President of
the Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew by lot the names of the other seven
members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr L.-E. Pettiti, Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr J.M. Morenilla, Sir John Freeland, Mr L. Wildhaber and Mr D. Gotchev
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Bernhardt, acting
through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Greek Government ("the
Government") and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of
the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in
consequence, the Registrar received the Government’s memorial on 13 June
1996 and the applicants’ claims under Article 50 (art. 50) on 12 August.
5. In accordance with the President’s decision, the hearing took place in
public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 September 1996.
The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr V. KONDOLAIMOS, Adviser, Legal Council
of State Delegate of the Agent,
Mr V. KYRIAZOPOULOS, Legal Assistant, Legal Council
of State, Adviser;
(b) for the Commission
Mr L. LOUCAIDES, Delegate.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Loucaides and Mr Kondolaimos.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
3
AS TO THE FACTS
I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The applications for authorisation to open a private language
school
6. Mr David Hornsby and his wife Mrs Ada Ann Hornsby were born in
the United Kingdom in 1937 and 1939 respectively. They are graduate
teachers of English and live on the island of Rhodes.
7. On 17 January 1984 the second applicant applied to the Ministry of
Education in Athens for authorisation to establish in Rhodes a private
school (frontistirion) for the teaching of English (see paragraph 29 below).
On 25 January the Ministry refused the application on the ground that only
Greek nationals could be granted such authorisation by the provincial
secondary education authorities.
8. On 12 March 1984 Mrs Hornsby tried to deliver a second application
in person at the offices of the Dodecanese Secondary Education Authority,
but the responsible civil servant refused to acknowledge receipt. After a
complaint had been lodged by Mrs Hornsby’s lawyer, the authority
informed her on 5 June 1984 that under the Greek legislation in force
foreign nationals could not obtain authorisation to open a frontistirion.
9. Mrs Hornsby, considering that making nationality a condition for
authorisation to establish a frontistirion contravened the Treaty of Rome of
25 March 1957, applied to the Commission of the European Communities,
which referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities. In a judgment of 15 March 1988 (no. 147/86, Commission of
the European Communities v. the Hellenic Republic), the Court of Justice
held that "by prohibiting nationals of other member States from setting up
frontistiria the Hellenic Republic [had] failed to fulfil its obligations under
Articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty".
10. On 1 April 1988 Mrs Hornsby made a further application to the
Dodecanese Secondary Education Authority and on the same day
Mr Hornsby separately sent the authority a similar application. On 12 April
1988 the authority refused both applications for the same reasons as it had
given in its reply of 5 June 1984 (see paragraph 8 above).
11. On 15 September 1988 the Director of Secondary Education for the
Dodecanese province informed the applicants that the question of granting
non-Greeks authorisation to open a frontistirion was being reviewed by the
competent authorities.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
4
12. In a letter of 23 November 1988 the applicants requested the Prime
Minister to take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with the judgment
given by the Court of Justice on 15 March 1988 (see paragraph 9 above).
B. The proceedings in the Supreme Administrative Court
13. On 8 June 1988 each of the applicants had lodged with the Supreme
Administrative Court an application to set aside the decisions of the
Dodecanese Director of Secondary Education (see paragraph 10 above).
By two judgments of 9 and 10 May 1989 (nos. 1337/1989 and
1361/1989), the Supreme Administrative Court set the decisions aside in the
following, identical terms:
"...
This application seeks annulment of the Dodecanese Director of Secondary
Education’s decision ... of 12 April 1988 rejecting the request of the applicant, a
British national, for authorisation to set up a frontistirion for foreign-language
teaching in Rhodes.
Section 68 (1) of Law no. 2545/1940 ... provides: ‘Authorisation to set up a
frontistirion shall be granted to natural persons possessing the qualifications required
for employment as a teacher in a primary or secondary school in the public system, or
having equivalent academic qualifications.’
In addition, Article 18 para. 1 of the Civil Servants Code - Article 2 para. 3 of which
also applies to secondary and primary teachers - provides: ‘No one shall be appointed
to a civil service post who does not have Greek nationality.’ It appears from these
provisions that it is against the law for a non-Greek to be given authorisation to set up
a frontistirion for the teaching of foreign languages.
Article 52 of the Treaty of 25 March 1957 instituting the EEC ... proclaims freedom
of establishment for the nationals of a member State within the territory of another
member State, prohibiting all discrimination on the ground of nationality as regards
the right to take up activities as self-employed persons and to set up and run
businesses. That provision ... has been ‘directly applicable’ in Greek law since
1 January 1981, when the Treaty came into force, without it being necessary to amend
Greek legislation beforehand to bring it into line with Community law.
The above-mentioned bar preventing non-Greeks from being granted authorisation
to set up a frontistirion for the purpose of teaching foreign languages, in so far as it
concerns the nationals of the other member States of the European Communities, is
contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty (judgment no. 147/86 of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 15 March 1988, Commission v. the Hellenic Republic), since
it has been without legal force, regard being had to the foregoing considerations, since
1 January 1981. Consequently, the impugned decision rejecting the applicant’s request
- based on the erroneous premiss that the bar complained of continues to apply to all
non-Greeks, without any distinction between the nationals of other member States of
the European Communities and the nationals of non-member States - is unlawful and
must therefore be set aside.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
5
The application under consideration must accordingly be allowed.
For these reasons
...
The Supreme Administrative Court sets aside the Rhodes Director of Secondary
Education’s decision ... of 12 April 1988.
..."
14. On 3 July 1989 two associations of frontistirion owners and three
owners of such establishments in Rhodes lodged a third-party appeal
(tritanakopi) against judgments nos. 1337/1989 and 1361/1989 with the
Supreme Administrative Court. This appeal was dismissed by the Supreme
Administrative Court on 25 April 1991.
15. On 8 August 1989 the applicants lodged two further applications for
authorisation with the Dodecanese Secondary Education Authority,
enclosing the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court and
emphasising that no further delay in granting authorisation could be
justified. However, they received no reply.
On 27 February 1990 the applicants’ lawyer again applied to the
authority.
C. The proceedings in the Rhodes Criminal Court
16. On 28 March 1990 the applicants brought a private prosecution in
the Rhodes Criminal Court against the Dodecanese Director of Secondary
Education and any other civil servant responsible, relying on Article 259 of
the Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below).
On 22 October 1993 the Criminal Court gave judgment against the
applicants, holding that even supposing the director had been acting
unlawfully when he refused authorisation, the intent required by Article 259
for the elements of the offence to be made out had not been established.
D. The proceedings in the Rhodes First Instance Civil Court
17. On 14 November 1990 the applicants brought proceedings in the
Rhodes First Instance Civil Court seeking compensation (Articles 914 and
932 of the Civil Code and sections 104 and 105 of the Introductory Law
(Isagogikos Nomos) to the Civil Code (see paragraph 26 below)) for the
prejudice they alleged had been caused them on account of the
administrative authorities’ refusal to comply with the judgments of the
Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraph 13 above). Mr and
Mrs Hornsby claimed 30,025,200 and 41,109,200 drachmas (GRD)
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
6
respectively for pecuniary damage and loss of income, and GRD
100,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
18. On 30 January 1992 the Rhodes First Instance Civil Court declared
the application inadmissible (judgment no. 32/1992) on the ground that the
dispute submitted to it came within the jurisdiction of the administrative
courts.
E. The proceedings in the Rhodes Administrative Court
19. On 3 July 1992 the applicants brought an action for damages against
the State in the Rhodes Administrative Court. They relied, inter alia, on
Article 914 of the Civil Code and section 105 of the Introductory Law to the
Civil Code. In addition, they argued that the compensation should cover not
only the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage they had already sustained
but also the damage they would continue to sustain until the administrative
authorities granted them the authorisation they sought.
On 15 December 1995, in judgment no. 346/1995, the Administrative
Court accepted that the administrative authorities had unlawfully refused to
process Mrs Hornsby’s application for authorisation of 12 March 1984 (see
paragraph 8 above) and that after publication of the judgments of the Court
of Justice and the Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraphs 9 and 13
above) they had failed to comply with them. However, considering that the
applicants had not sufficiently proved the damage they claimed to have
sustained, it ordered further investigative measures.
F. The applications to the Minister of Education
20. On 20 April 1990 the applicants asked the Minister of Education to
intervene. They applied to him again on 14 January and 29 July 1991 and to
the Minister responsible for managing Cabinet business on 25 October
1991.
21. On 14 January 1993 the Dodecanese Director of Secondary
Education informed the applicants that he had written to the Minister of
Education to ask if he could grant the authorisation requested, in the light of
the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments of 25 April 1991 (see
paragraph 14 above). On 3 May 1993 he informed them that he had again
written to the Minister reminding him that two years had already gone by
since the above-mentioned judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court
and that their application was still pending. He also referred to three
previous letters to the Minister which had gone unanswered.
22. A presidential decree (no. 211/1994) published on 10 August 1994
recognised the right of nationals of member States of the European
Communities to establish frontistiria in Greece (see paragraph 28 below).
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
7
However, those who did not possess a Greek secondary school-leaving
certificate had to pass an examination in Greek language and history.
On 20 October 1994 the Minister of Education asked the Dodecanese
Director of Secondary Education to resume consideration of the applicants’
request in the light of Presidential Decree no. 211/1994 and to keep the
Ministry informed of further developments.
On 11 November 1994 the Director sent the applicants a photocopy of
the decree and urged them to take the necessary steps. On 7 February 1996
he wrote to them again expressing his surprise that they had not yet taken
the examination they needed to pass in order to obtain authorisation to open
a frontistirion and to teach in one. He informed them that it was illegal for
them to continue working in a frontistirion (belonging to a Greek national)
under the relevant new legislation and asked them to regularise their
situation if they wished to avoid application of the statutory penalties.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Constitution
23. Article 95 para. 5 of the 1975 Constitution provides:
"The administrative authorities shall be under an obligation to comply with
judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court setting aside their decisions. Breach
of that obligation shall engage the responsibility of any authority in breach, according
to the provisions of statute law."
B. The Criminal Code
24. Article 259 of the Criminal Code provides:
"Breach of an official duty
A civil servant who deliberately breaches an official duty with the intention of
unlawfully obtaining a pecuniary advantage for himself or another or who causes
prejudice to the State or a third party shall be punished by up to two years’
imprisonment, save where the offence is punishable pursuant to another provision of
criminal law."
C. The Civil Code
25. The relevant Articles of the Civil Code read as follows:
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
8
Article 57
"Personal rights
Any person whose personal rights are unlawfully infringed shall be entitled to bring
proceedings to enforce cessation of the infringement and restraint of any future
infringement. Where the personal rights infringed are those of a deceased person, the
right to bring proceedings shall be vested in his spouse, descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters and testamentary beneficiaries. In addition, claims for damages in
accordance with the provisions relating to unlawful acts shall not be excluded."
Article 59
"Reparation for non-pecuniary damage
In the cases provided for in the two preceding Articles, the court may, in the
judgment it gives on the application of the person whose right has been infringed, and
regard being had to the nature of the infringement, also order the infringer to make
reparation for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damage. Such reparation shall consist in
the payment of a sum of money, publication of the court’s decision and any other
measure appropriate in the circumstances of the case."
D. Introductory Law to the Civil Code
26. The following provisions of the Introductory Law (Isagogikos
Nomos) to the Civil Code (Law no. 2783/41) are relevant:
Section 104
"The State shall be liable in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
concerning legal persons, for acts or omissions of its organs regarding private-law
relations or State assets."
Section 105
"The State shall be under a duty to make good any damage caused by the unlawful
acts or omissions of its organs in the exercise of public authority, except where the
unlawful act or omission is in breach of an existing provision but is intended to serve
the public interest. The person responsible shall be jointly and severally liable, without
prejudice to the special provisions on ministerial responsibility."
E. Application for judicial review in the Supreme Administrative
Court
27. Sections 45 and 50 of Presidential Decree no. 18/1989 codifying
the legislative provisions on the Supreme Administrative Court, of
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
9
30 December 1988/9 January 1989, govern applications for judicial review
of acts or omissions by the administrative authorities:
Section 45
"Acts which may be challenged
1. An application for judicial review alleging ultra vires or unlawful action is
available only in respect of enforceable decisions of the administrative authorities and
public-law legal persons and against which no appeal lies to another court.
...
4. Where the law requires an authority to settle a specific question by issuing an
enforceable decision subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, an application for
judicial review is admissible even in respect of the said authority’s failure to issue
such decision.
The authority shall be presumed to refuse the measure either when any specific
time-limit prescribed by the law expires or after three months have elapsed from the
lodging of the application with the authority, which is required to issue an
acknowledgment of receipt ... indicating the date of receipt. Applications for judicial
review lodged before the above time-limits shall be inadmissible.
An application for judicial review validly lodged against an implied refusal [on the
part of the authorities] is deemed also to contest any negative decision that may
subsequently be taken by the authorities. Such decision may however be challenged
separately.
..."
Section 46
"Time-limit
1. Except as otherwise provided, an application for judicial review must be made
within sixty days of the day following the date of notification of the impugned
decision or the date of publication ..., or, otherwise, of the day following the day on
which the applicant acquired knowledge of the decision. In the cases provided for in
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of section 45, time begins to run when the time-limits prescribed
in those provisions have expired.
..."
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
10
Section 50
"Consequences of the decision
1. The decision allowing an application for judicial review shall declare the
impugned measure void, which entails its general nullity, whether it is a general or
individual measure.
...
3. In the case of failure to take action, where the Supreme Administrative Court
allows the application, it shall refer the case back to the relevant authority so that it
can take the action incumbent on it.
4. In discharging the obligation imposed on them by Article 95 para. 5 of the
Constitution, the administrative authorities must comply with the judgments of the
Supreme Administrative Court in the light of the circumstances of each case, either by
taking positive measures to that end or by refraining from any action contrary to the
Supreme Administrative Court’s decision. Failure to do so may entail, in addition to
the criminal penalties laid down by Article 259 of the Criminal Code, personal
liability in damages.
5. Judgments of the plenary court or the divisions allowing or refusing applications
to set aside shall constitute binding authority in respect of the parties to a particular
case and also in respect of each case or dispute pending before the judicial or other
authorities where the administrative issue determined by the Supreme Administrative
Court is decisive for the outcome."
F. Presidential Decree no. 211/1994
28. The presidential decree of 10 August 1994 on "bringing Greek
legislation concerning the setting up and running of frontistiria ... into
conformity with Articles 7, 48, 52, 58 and 59 of the Treaty instituting the
European Economic Community" provides:
Section 1
"The purpose of the present decree is to bring Greek legislation concerning the
setting-up and running of frontistiria ... into conformity with Articles 7, 48, 52, 58 and
59 of the Treaty instituting the European Economic Community, by abolishing all
forms of discrimination on the ground of nationality."
Section 2
"In addition to what is provided in section 68 (1) of Law no. 2545/1940 on private
schools, frontistiria and boarding-schools, authorisation to set up a frontistirion shall
also be granted to nationals of the member States of the European Union, providing
that they have the qualifications required by law for such authorisation to be granted to
a Greek national. European Union nationals shall be required to produce similar
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
11
documentary evidence and the certificate prescribed by section 14 (10) of Law
no. 1566/1985, which shall be applicable by analogy."
Section 14 (10) of Law no. 1566/1985 provides:
"If the applicants ... do not have a Greek secondary school-leaving certificate, they
shall be required to produce a certificate attesting that they understand Greek and
speak it fluently and have a knowledge of Greek history. In order to obtain such a
certificate, applicants must take an examination under regulations laid down by the
Minister for Education and Religious Affairs."
G. Law no. 2545/1940 on private schools, frontistiria and boarding-
schools
29. Section 63 of Law no. 2545/1940 defines a frontistirion as "the
organisation in one place of courses for groups of more than five persons,
or, regardless of the composition of the groups, for more than ten persons in
total per week, which have as their purpose, either to supplement and
consolidate instruction forming part of the curriculum for primary,
secondary and higher education (the latter whether or not preparatory to
university entrance), or to teach foreign languages or music or to provide
general training in extra-curricular activities, for not more than three hours a
day per group consisting of the same persons".
Section 68 of the same Law provides that the setting up of a frontistirion
is subject to authorisation which may be granted only to natural persons
who hold the qualifications required for employment in the civil service as a
teacher in the public-education system. Those qualifications include,
according to Article 18 of the Public Servants Code, the possession of
Greek nationality.
According to Law no. 284/1968, frontistiria for foreign languages may
be administered only by persons holding the statutory qualifications; for a
definition of those qualifications, reference is made to Law no. 2545/1940,
which requires, in particular, the possession of Greek nationality.
Greek nationality is also required in the case of all persons teaching in a
frontistirion of whatever kind. The only exception to that rule was laid down
by Decree no. 46508/1976 of the Minister for Education and Religious
Affairs. That decree, which, however, applies only to frontistiria engaged in
the teaching of foreign languages, provides:
"Each frontistirion may employ only one foreign national if it does not employ more
than four foreign-language teachers of Greek nationality. If it employs more than four
Greek nationals, it shall be authorised to employ more foreign nationals in the
proportion of one foreign national to five Greek nationals."
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
12
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
30. Mr and Mrs Hornsby applied to the Commission on 7 January 1990.
They alleged a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1) on
account of the authorities’ refusal to comply with two judgments of the
Supreme Administrative Court.
31. The Commission declared the application (no. 18357/91) admissible
on 31 August 1994. On 11 April 1995 it rejected a new request in which the
Government asked it to declare the application inadmissible in accordance
with Article 29 of the Convention (art. 29). In its report of 23 October 1995
(Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the opinion by twenty-seven votes to one
that there had been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-
1). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the two separate
opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment
3
.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT BY THE
GOVERNMENT
32. In their memorial the Government asked the Court "to dismiss the
application lodged by Ada Ann and David Hornsby in its entirety".
AS TO THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
33. The Government argued as their main submission, as they had
before the Commission, that the application was inadmissible for non-
observance of the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 26 of the
Convention (art. 26) and for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
A. Non-observance of the six-month time-limit
34. The Government requested the Court to dismiss the application
pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention (art. 26), as the applicants had not
lodged their application with the Commission within six months of the dates
3
Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed
version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II), but a copy of the
Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
13
when the Supreme Administrative Court delivered its judgments
nos. 1337/1989 and 1361/1989.
35. Like the Commission, the Court notes that the situation complained
of by the applicants began with the relevant authorities’ refusal to grant
them the authorisation they sought - despite the above-mentioned judgments
of the Supreme Administrative Court - and continued even after the lodging
of their application to the Commission, on 7 January 1990. In April 1990
and in January and July 1991 the applicants wrote to the Minister of
Education on the subject (see paragraph 20 above). Moreover, the Supreme
Administrative Court dismissed the third-party appeal on 25 April 1991.
This objection must therefore be dismissed.
B. Failure to exhaust domestic remedies
36. The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the
remedies available to them under Greek law as Article 26 of the Convention
(art. 26) required. In the first place, they had not brought actions for
damages in the civil courts under Articles 57 (personal rights) and 59
(reparation for non-pecuniary damage) of the Civil Code (see paragraph 25
above). Secondly, they had not sought judicial review of the administrative
authorities’ implied refusal to act on the renewed applications for
authorisation of 8 August 1989 (see paragraph 15 above). Lastly, the
proceedings they had brought in the Rhodes Administrative Court were still
pending (see paragraph 19 above).
37. As regards the actions for damages provided for in Articles 57 and
59 of the Civil Code, the Court considers that in this case they cannot be
deemed sufficient to remedy the applicants’ complaints. Even supposing
that the outcome of such actions had been favourable to the applicants,
compensation for non-pecuniary damage or an infringement of personal
rights would not have been an alternative solution to the measures which the
Greek legal system should have afforded them whereby they might remedy
the impossibility of their opening a language school despite the judicial
decisions which had removed every obstacle in that respect.
As regards judicial review in the Supreme Administrative Court, there is
no reason to suppose that the applicants would have obtained the
authorisation they sought since, pursuant to section 50 (3) of Presidential
Decree no. 18/1989, the Supreme Administrative Court refers such cases
back to the relevant authority (see paragraph 27 above). The applicants,
however, who had met with that authority’s persistent failure to reply - at
least until May 1993 (see paragraph 21 above) - to their repeated
applications, could not reasonably expect such a remedy to bring them the
result they sought.
Lastly, as regards the proceedings in the Rhodes Administrative Court,
the Court considers that these are decisive only in connection with the
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
14
question of the award of just satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention
(art. 50).
Accordingly, this objection must be dismissed.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 OF THE
CONVENTION (art. 6-1)
38. The applicants alleged that the administrative authorities’ refusal to
comply with the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments of 9 and
10 May 1989 had infringed their right to effective judicial protection of their
civil rights. They relied on Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1),
which provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law ..."
39. The Government did not deny that the proceedings in the Supreme
Administrative Court concerned the applicants’ civil rights within the
meaning of Article 6 (art. 6). They submitted that the Supreme
Administrative Court had ruled on those rights in full compliance with the
requirements of that Article (art. 6) and had given two judgments in the
applicants’ favour, the content of which was not contested by the
administrative authorities.
However, they maintained that the applicants’ complaint did not fall
within the scope of Article 6 (art. 6), which guaranteed only the fairness of
the "trial" in the literal sense of that term, that is the proceedings conducted
before the judicial authority alone. The lodging of the applicants’ two
applications of 8 August 1989 and the administrative authorities’ failure to
reply (see paragraph 15 above) had not created a new "dispute"
(contestation in the French text) over their civil rights. The administrative
authorities’ delay in complying with the above-mentioned judgments of the
Supreme Administrative Court was an entirely different question from the
judicial determination of the existence of those rights. Execution of the
judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court fell within the sphere of
public law and, in particular, of the relations between the judicial and
administrative authorities, but could not in any circumstances be deemed to
come within the ambit of Article 6 (art. 6); such a conclusion could not be
deduced from either the wording of that Article (art. 6) or even the
intentions of those who had drafted the Convention.
Lastly, the Government contested the analogy drawn by the Commission
in its report between the Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands case (judgment of
19 April 1994, Series A no. 288) and the Hornsby case. In the former case
the Crown’s (statutory) power partially or completely to deprive a judgment
of its effect rendered the proper administration of justice nugatory. In the
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
15
present case, however, the administrative authorities had unlawfully failed
to comply with a final judicial decision and could be compelled to do so by
any of the numerous remedies afforded by the Greek legal system.
40. The Court reiterates that, according to its established case-law,
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) secures to everyone the right to have any claim
relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal;
in this way it embodies the "right to a court", of which the right of access,
that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters,
constitutes one aspect (see the Philis v. Greece judgment of 27 August
1991, Series A no. 209, p. 20, para. 59). However, that right would be
illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final,
binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party.
It would be inconceivable that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) should describe in
detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants - proceedings that are fair,
public and expeditious - without protecting the implementation of judicial
decisions; to construe Article 6 (art. 6) as being concerned exclusively with
access to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to
situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the
Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of
21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, pp. 16-18, paras. 34-36). Execution of a
judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part
of the "trial" for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6); moreover, the Court has
already accepted this principle in cases concerning the length of proceedings
(see, most recently, the Di Pede v. Italy and Zappia v. Italy judgments of 26
September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, pp. 1383-
1384, paras. 20-24, and pp. 1410-1411, paras. 16-20 respectively).
41. The above principles are of even greater importance in the context
of administrative proceedings concerning a dispute whose outcome is
decisive for a litigant’s civil rights. By lodging an application for judicial
review with the State’s highest administrative court the litigant seeks not
only annulment of the impugned decision but also and above all the removal
of its effects. The effective protection of a party to such proceedings and the
restoration of legality presuppose an obligation on the administrative
authorities’ part to comply with a judgment of that court. The Court
observes in this connection that the administrative authorities form one
element of a State subject to the rule of law and their interests accordingly
coincide with the need for the proper administration of justice. Where
administrative authorities refuse or fail to comply, or even delay doing so,
the guarantees under Article 6 (art. 6) enjoyed by a litigant during the
judicial phase of the proceedings are rendered devoid of purpose.
42. The Court notes that following the judgment of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities (see paragraph 9 above) the Supreme
Administrative Court set aside the two decisions by which the Director of
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
16
Secondary Education had refused the applicants - solely on the basis of their
nationality - the authorisation they sought (see paragraphs 7-8 and 13
above). As a result of these judgments the applicants could then assert the
right to satisfaction of their requests; in repeating them on 8 August 1989
(see paragraph 15 above) they were merely reminding the administrative
authorities of their obligation to take a decision consistent with the legal
rules whose breach had led to the setting aside of the impugned decisions.
Nevertheless, the authorities did not reply until 20 October 1994 (see
paragraph 22 above). Admittedly, the applicants could have made a further
application for judicial review of this implied refusal under sections 45 and
46 of Presidential Decree no. 18/1989 (see paragraph 27 above), but in the
circumstances of the case the Court considers that they could not reasonably
expect such a remedy to bring them the result they sought (see paragraph 37
above).
43. The Court understands the national authorities’ concern to regulate,
after the above-mentioned judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court,
the setting up and operation of frontistiria in a manner which was
compatible with the country’s international obligations and at the same time
calculated to ensure the quality of the instruction provided. Moreover, it is
right and proper that the authorities should have a reasonable time to choose
the most suitable means to give effect to the judgments concerned.
44. However, from 15 March 1988, when the Court of Justice of the
European Communities gave judgment (see paragraph 9 above), and in any
event from 9 and 10 May 1989, when the Supreme Administrative Court
gave its ruling on the applicants’ case (see paragraph 13 above), until the
adoption of Presidential Decree no. 211/1994 on 10 August 1994 the Greek
legislation in force laid down no particular condition for nationals of
European Community member States who wished to open a frontistirion in
Greece apart from the condition imposed on Greek nationals also, namely
possession of a university degree, which the applicants satisfied (see
paragraphs 6 and 29 above).
Furthermore, it does not appear that the applicants have given up their
objective of opening a frontistirion; when they applied on 3 July 1992 to the
Rhodes Administrative Court they sought compensation not only for the
damage they alleged they had sustained but also for the damage they would
continue to sustain up to the date on which the administrative authorities
granted them the authorisation requested (see paragraph 19 above).
45. By refraining for more than five years from taking the necessary
measures to comply with a final, enforceable judicial decision in the present
case the Greek authorities deprived the provisions of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1) of all useful effect.
There has accordingly been a breach of that Article (art. 6-1).
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
17
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 50)
46. The applicants made various claims under Article 50 of the
Convention (art. 50), which provides:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any
other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with
the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party
allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or
measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party."
47. At the hearing the Government informed the Court that, if it were to
find a violation, it would be possible under the Greek legal system for the
applicants to obtain compensation in full. Indeed, in the proceedings they
had brought in the Rhodes Administrative Court (see paragraph 19 above),
which were still pending on the day of the hearing, the sums sought
corresponded to a large extent to the sums claimed under Article 50 of the
Convention (art. 50).
48. The Delegate of the Commission made no comment.
49. The Court considers that the question of the application of Article
50 (art. 50) is not ready for decision, and that it must be reserved, due regard
being had to the possibility of an agreement between the respondent State
and the applicants (Rule 54 paras. 1 and 4).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Dismisses by eight votes to one the Government’s preliminary
objections;
2. Holds by seven votes to two that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
(art. 6-1) is applicable in the case and has been breached;
3. Holds unanimously that the question of the application of Article 50 of
the Convention (art. 50) is not ready for decision;
accordingly
(a) reserves it;
(b) invites the Government and the applicants to submit their
observations on the said question within the forthcoming three months,
and in particular to inform it of any agreement they might reach;
(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the
Chamber power to fix the same if need be.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
18
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the
Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 March 1997.
Rudolf BERNHARDT
President
Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 of the Convention (art. 51-2) and
Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the following separate opinions are
annexed to this judgment:
(a) concurring opinion of Judge Morenilla;
(b) dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti;
(c) dissenting opinion of Judge Valticos.
R. B.
H. P.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA
19
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA
1. I voted with the majority for the finding that there was a violation of
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1) in the present case. In the
following paragraphs I express my point of view separately.
2. In my opinion this case opens a new, dynamic stage in the
development through case-law of the concept of the "right to a court" in a
field - administrative proceedings - which has very deep historical roots in
the legal systems of many European States influenced by French
administrative law. The specific features which distinguish administrative
proceedings from civil proceedings are mostly based on the existence of a
decision on the part of the respondent public authority which has directly
harmed someone’s personal rights or legitimate interests.
3. The applicants alleged that the administrative authorities’ refusal to
comply with the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court setting
aside the decisions refusing them the authorisation they had sought to open
an English-teaching school in Rhodes on the sole ground that they did not
have Greek nationality, when they were nationals of another member State
of the European Communities, had infringed their right to effective judicial
protection of their civil rights. The Court concluded (see paragraph 45): "By
refraining for more than five years from taking the necessary measures to
comply with a final, enforceable judicial decision in the present case the
Greek authorities deprived the provisions of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1) of all useful effect."
4. The present case therefore raises the question of the scope of the
judgments given by the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with
the applicants’ applications to set aside the above decisions of the
competent administrative authorities refusing the authorisation sought. The
same question might arise, mutatis mutandis, in other systems based on the
French model of administrative proceedings.
5. The French Conseil d’Etat has succeeded in turning administrative
proceedings into a safeguard for the individual against excesses on the part
of the public authorities by making them similar to civil proceedings, with
just one difference: the review of the lawfulness of the administrative
decision in issue carried out by the administrative courts. That difference
was a decisive factor in the creation of an independent procedure within the
jurisdiction of the administrative courts, with the Conseil d’Etat at the top of
the hierarchy as the supreme organ responsible for scrutiny of the
administrative authorities.
6. Because of the way the system has developed over the course of time,
its primary purpose is to review the lawfulness of the impugned decision
(particularly by means of an application to set aside). In such proceedings
the administrative court, in setting aside the unlawful decision, exhausts its
powers. "Thus the judge can only set aside the unlawful administrative
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA
20
decision, otherwise he would infringe the principle of the separation
between administrative authorities and administrative courts. He cannot, by
his own judicial decisions, try to fill in the vacuum created by the decision
to set aside" (see Debbasch-Ricci, Contentieux administratif, Paris, 1990, p.
833).
7. That was the historical-legal context in which, on 9 and 10 May
1980, the Greek Supreme Administrative Court delivered the judgments
which were not implemented by the administrative authorities, a failure on
their part which was considered by the majority to constitute an
infringement of the applicants’ right to a court.
8. In the present case Mrs Ada Hornsby applied in 1984 (after Greece
joined the European Communities) for authorisation to set up a private
English-teaching school. The administrative authorities rejected this
application on the sole ground that such authorisation could be granted only
to Greek nationals. The Court of Justice of the European Communities held
that there had been a failure by Greece to comply with the requirements of
Articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty, which conferred on the nationals of
one member State the freedom to settle in the territory of another while at
the same time prohibiting all discrimination on the ground of nationality as
regards the right to take up activities as self-employed persons and to set up
and run businesses.
9. The Supreme Administrative Court’s (identical) judgments mention
the qualifications required pursuant to section 68 (1) of Law no. 2545/1940
for authorisation to open a frontistirion; such authorisation "shall be granted
to natural persons possessing the qualifications required for employment as
a teacher in a primary or secondary school in the public system, or having
equivalent academic qualifications". They also refer to Article 18 para. 1 of
the Civil Servants Code - Article 2 para. 3 of which also applies to
secondary and primary teachers - which provides: "No one shall be
appointed to a civil service post who does not have Greek nationality", and
conclude: "It appears from these provisions that it is against the law for a
non-Greek to be given authorisation to set up a frontistirion for the teaching
of foreign languages."
After mentioning Article 52 of the EEC Treaty and citing judgment no.
147/86 of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, of 15 March
1988 (Commission v. the Hellenic Republic), the Supreme Administrative
Court went on to say: "Consequently, the impugned decision rejecting the
applicant’s request - based on the erroneous premiss that the bar complained
of continues to apply to all non-Greeks, without any distinction between the
nationals of other member States of the European Communities and the
nationals of non-member States - is unlawful and must therefore be set
aside. The application under consideration must accordingly be allowed. For
these reasons ... [t]he Supreme Administrative Court sets aside the Rhodes
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA
21
Director of Secondary Education’s decision ..." (see paragraph 13 of the
judgment).
10. According to section 50 (1) of Presidential Decree no. 18/1989
codifying the legislative provisions on the Supreme Administrative Court,
"The decision allowing an application for judicial review shall declare the
impugned measure void, which entails its general nullity, whether it is a
general or individual measure." Section 50 (4) provides: "In discharging the
obligation imposed on them by Article 95 para. 5 of the Constitution [see
paragraph 23 of the judgment], the administrative authorities must comply
with the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court in the light of the
circumstances of each case, either by taking positive measures to that end or
by refraining from any action contrary to the Supreme Administrative
Court’s decision. Failure to do so may entail, in addition to ... criminal
penalties ..., personal liability in damages."
11. According to that legislation, the Supreme Administrative Court’s
judgments were final decisions allowing Mr and Mrs Hornsby’s
applications to set aside and determined the specific issue. The refusal of
authorisation to open a frontistirion was set aside as being contrary to
Article 52 of the Treaty instituting the European Economic Community,
which was directly applicable in Greece at the time when the applications
for authorisation were made. Admittedly, the judgments did not set aside the
administrative authorities’ refusal on account of any other illegalities which
might have vitiated it - relating, for example, to the question whether the
applicants had the qualifications required of Greek nationals by the
legislation then in force. In their operative provisions they did no more than
set aside the refusal of authorisation without ordering that the authorisation
sought should be granted. As a result, in spite of further requests for
execution of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments, the Greek
administrative authorities have still, eight years later, not granted the
authorisation to which the applicants were entitled under the Greek law in
force at the time.
12. That being the case, the rigidity - and indeed formalism - of
administrative proceedings to set aside cannot justify this denial of justice
nor require further procedural steps to be taken to obtain a new court
decision on a case where the applicants’ rights had been determined by the
highest administrative court. Nevertheless, the opinion of the majority is
consistent with our case-law, which interprets Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1) in accordance with the principles established in its
Preamble and in Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
that is to say in a teleological, autonomous and evolutive manner, adapted to
social needs. In the Golder judgment of 21 February 1975 (Series A no. 18,
p. 17, para. 35) the Court held: "The principle whereby a civil claim must be
capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally
‘recognised’ fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA
22
of international law which forbids the denial of justice. Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) must be read in the light of these principles."
13. That unitary view of judicial proceedings, in which disputed
personal rights are the subject of detailed argument between the parties
before a judge who must later make a final determination of them, seems to
be opposed to a rather abstract idea of justice in which the individual is
obliged to go to a court, as if he were responsible for law enforcement, to
contest the lawfulness of an administrative decision, though that decision is
prejudicial to his personal rights. Even if his application to set aside is
allowed, such a procedure cannot bring him redress for the injury done to
him because the court remits the case to the administrative authorities for
them to recommence the proceedings.
14. The Court has already expressed its views on the effectiveness of
such proceedings "by instalments" in the following terms: "Even supposing
that the Supreme Administrative Court had allowed [the applicants’]
application, there is nothing to indicate that they would have obtained the
authorisation sought, as the authorities did not in practice always comply
with the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court" (see the
Manoussakis and Others v. Greece judgment of 26 September 1996,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1359, para. 33). Likewise,
in the Scollo v. Italy judgment of 28 September 1995 (Series A no. 315-C,
p. 55, para. 44), the Court held: "the inertia of the competent administrative
authorities engages the responsibility of the Italian State under Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1)."
15. Consequently, in spite of the difficulties of adapting it to a now
outdated concept of historical administrative law (see Garcia de Enterria-
Fernandez Rodriguez, Curso de Derecho Administrativo, Madrid, 1986,
vol. II, pp. 36-54), on the effectiveness of the fundamental right of access to
a court I agree with the majority’s finding of a violation. This element is
becoming essential for the administration of justice in a democratic society
and a firm enunciation of the principle seems to me as timely as it is
necessary. In short, I see this as a step towards harmonisation of the
safeguards required in administrative proceedings and civil proceedings in
order to ensure more effective protection of the rights of individuals in their
dealings with administrative authorities. Administrative decisions are
ceasing to occupy the dominant position in administrative proceedings and
becoming merely the reason for their existence. The object of administrative
proceedings is formed solely by the originating application, from which the
legal situations of the individuals concerned are derived.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
23
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
I voted with the minority for non-violation, on account of the reasoning
and the legal stance adopted by the majority, whose arguments did not, in
my opinion, take sufficient account of the specific features of the present
case.
It was not a question of the general application of Article 6 (art. 6) by the
courts of the member States of the Council of Europe, whether or not
members of the European Union, or of refusal to comply with a judicial
decision which had become "final and enforceable" in respect of a particular
litigant.
Before that stage it was, above all, a dispute over Community law
between a litigant who was a national of a Community member State and a
State which was a member of the European Union.
On 15 March 1988 the Court of Justice of the European Communities
held that the Hellenic Republic had failed to comply with its obligations
under Articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty by prohibiting EEC nationals to
set up frontistiria (language schools).
The European Court of Human Rights should therefore draw a
distinction between review of the lawfulness of the impugned decision and
the adoption of legal decisions designed to fill the vacuum created by the
decision to set aside.
On this point, I endorse that part of Judge Morenilla’s concurring opinion
which reads:
"According to that legislation, the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments were
final decisions allowing Mr and Mrs Hornsby’s applications to set aside and
determined the specific issue. The refusal of authorisation to open a frontistirion was
set aside as being contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty instituting the European
Economic Community, which was directly applicable in Greece at the time when the
applications for authorisation were made. Admittedly, the judgments did not set aside
the administrative authorities’ refusal on account of any other illegalities which might
have vitiated it - relating, for example, to the question whether the applicants had the
qualifications required of Greek nationals by the legislation then in force. In their
operative provisions they did no more than set aside the refusal of authorisation
without ordering that the authorisation sought should be granted. As a result, in spite
of further requests for execution of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments,
the Greek administrative authorities have still, eight years later, not granted the
authorisation to which the applicants were entitled under the Greek law in force at the
time."
Irrespective of the specific remedies and actions against the State for
breaches of Community law, and looking at the case purely from the
standpoint of Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6), it must be considered that
the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments did no more than set aside
as null and void the decision of 12 April 1988 rejecting the application for
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
24
authorisation to open a school, which was contrary to the decision of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities.
These judgments did not have any operative provisions obliging the State
to grant the applicants authorisation to open a school. The refusal of
authorisation which gave rise to the judgments could not therefore, in my
opinion (and contrary to what is said in paragraph 45), be held for the
purposes of Article 6 (art. 6) to constitute a denial of justice for failure to
execute them directly.
But since the applicants had already applied to the administrative and
judicial authorities according to the correct procedures it was incumbent
upon the State, immediately after the judgments of the Supreme
Administrative Court, to make speedy arrangements to control access,
including regulations and forms for verifying qualifications, and to organise
the qualifying examination. The authorities’ failure to do so, in spite of the
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, resulted in
deadlock. The control process adopted by the States of the European Union
in the matter of the directives relating to practice as a lawyer could have
been implemented. If it had been, a finding either that the applicants no
longer wished to maintain their request or that the State had refused to apply
the law would have permitted the conclusion that there had not been or that
there had been a breach of Article 6 (art. 6). The delay by the authorities in
fulfilling their administrative obligations under Community law could, to a
certain extent, have amounted to a refusal of access and unwillingness to
accept a judicial solution, which would, if so, have constituted a violation of
Article 6 (art. 6). In that sense, the conclusion adopted in the judgment was
not necessary as matters stood.
HORNSBY v. GREECE JUDGMENT
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VALTICOS
25
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VALTICOS
In the present case there are certainly many criticisms that can be made
of Greek legislation, the Greek administrative and governmental authorities
and the Greek courts. However, account must also be taken of the time
element, more recent measures and the applicants’ conduct.
There was incontestably a failure to bring legislation into line with the
legal order of the European Communities, or in any event a lengthy delay in
doing so. In addition - and this was not the first case of the kind - a long
period of time elapsed before the applicants received any reply from the
Minister of Education. And when, more than ten years after their initial
applications, Presidential Decree no. 211/1994, published on 10 August
1994, finally gave the nationals of member States of the European
Community the right to set up frontistiria (private schools in Greece), it was
on condition, for those who did not have a Greek secondary school-leaving
certificate, that they pass an examination in Greek language and history.
Even on that point, while it is quite easy to understand the need to ensure
that those concerned have an adequate knowledge of Greek, one might
wonder why a knowledge of Greek history should be necessary for those
who wish to teach foreign languages, and this requirement is certainly open
to criticism.
That, however, is not the issue. The issue is simpler, as matters stand at
present. The applicants lodged a complaint which was originally, without a
doubt, well-founded. After an admittedly excessive delay the Government
brought Greek legislation into line with European law - for the most part, at
least - and the violation was remedied, though tardily, I repeat. The
applicants were then twice asked to take an examination (see paragraph 22,
3rd sub-paragraph, of the judgment), which, on the whole, may be regarded
as a reasonable condition. They did not do so and seem to have abandoned
their application for authorisation to open a school, preferring the prospect
of substantial compensation to a gamble on their results in such an
examination. The essential role of the Court is to ensure the application of
the Convention’s provisions and to impel the Contracting States to apply it.
It is not to condemn retrospectively violations for which redress has been
afforded. At the time of delivery of the present judgment it appears, firstly,
that the impugned legislation has been brought into conformity with the
Convention, on the whole, and secondly that the applicants are no longer
pursuing their application to open a school. It is regrettable that this
important information was not given in paragraph 45 of the judgment.
In any case, after the - admittedly tardy - measures taken by the
Government, it cannot be said that there is, at the present time, a violation of
the Convention, as the Court seems to have decided.